The article considers models of collective production in the context of information asymmetry and the presence of a conflict of interests between agents. The assumptions and conclusions of the models are formulated, the properties of the optimal contract are given. The optimal contract is compared with the situation of absence of a conflict of interests, conclusions are made about the possibilities of reducing the damage from opportunistic behavior. In conclusion, an assessment is made of the strengths and weaknesses of this approach to modeling contractual relationships.
collective production, information asymmetry, conflict of interests
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